

## **(Re)constructing Community in Berlin.**

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### Turks, Jews, and German Responsibility

In Hungary we always said we were Hungarian Jews. Even in the concentration camps we would say, "that is a Hungarian Jew," "that's a Polish Jew" or "that's a German Jew." After the war, I just felt like a Jew. Now, where I've been for nearly fifty years, I feel like a German Jew.(1)

When a Muslim has lived here for thirty or forty years, then he has become German--as have his kids. When he is constantly being reproached for not assimilating--that is, told he doesn't need a mosque that looks like a mosque, or that his kids do not have to learn about Islam in school like the other Christian and Jewish kids, then there is not really equality before the law in Germany.(2)

An immigration dilemma has confronted the Federal Republic of Germany since the early 1970s. Postwar labor migrants from predominantly Muslim countries in the Mediterranean basin were not officially encouraged to settle long-term, yet many stayed once immigration was halted in 1973. Though these migrants and their children have enjoyed most social state benefits and the right to family reunification, their political influence has remained limited for the last quarter-century. Foreigners from non-EU countries may not vote in Germany, migrants are underrepresented in political institutions, and state recognition of Muslim religious and cultural diversity has not been forthcoming. Since 1990, however, a much smaller but significant number of Jewish migrants from eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have arrived in Germany. This population of almost 150,000 has been welcomed at the intersection of reparations policy and immigrant integration practice. Official readiness to accept and incorporate these foreign Jews into a German religious community stands in contrast to religion and integration policy towards other non-German migrant populations.

In interviews, administrators and politicians use cultural preconceptions--rather than historical explanations--to explain these legal distinctions and administrative practices. Culture trumps history as a justification for special treatment of Jews. These officials could easily contend that Germany's responsibility to European Jewry is greater than what, if anything, it "owes" Turkish Muslims who have settled in Germany. But today's migrant Jews are not European in the sense that they hold citizenship of any European Union country. In the interviews cited below, the belief in migrant Jews' (and their occasionally non-Jewish family members') cultural ties to Germany supports the presumption that they will quickly adapt to and assimilate German ways. These frames construct a "useful fiction" similar to the logic allowing the immigration of ethnic German Spataussiedler. Foreign Jews are viewed as cultural neighbors and their commitment to "becoming German" is portrayed as unassailable. Turks, on the other hand, because of presumed ties to their "fatherland" and Muslim customs, are often suspected of being less integration-willing or assimilable. "To return home" is cited in several interviews as a real possibility for second and

third-generation Turkish immigrants.

These cultural frames obscure basic commonalities of these two migrant religious minority groups. About 70 percent of Berlin's Turkish Muslim and former Soviet Jewish populations were born outside of Germany.(3) The foreign-born Jews and Turks usually have no German ancestry and arrive with poor knowledge of the German language. Most do not give up their native passports whether or not they naturalize.(4) The reticence to encourage community formation among non-German Muslims versus official sponsorship of a community-based Jewish identity among the mostly non-German Jews provides an interesting point of comparison. The distinctive stances towards both groups are based solely on self-declared faith and family ties, not any "one-drop" rule of blind ancestral or racial determination.

Faced with heterogeneous societies and persistent national borders, scholars have debated the relevance of the nation-state to migrant social and political rights acquisition and the desirability of multiculturalism.(5) Even though labor migration to the continent had mostly ended by 1973, immigrants did not stop coming. Over 600,000 non-German migrants legally migrated to Germany in 1999 alone.(6) Policies in favor of family reunification, political asylum, and high-skilled labor bolstered foreign settlements and continued to diversify the national landscapes. Likewise, "church-state" relations were not engraved in stone with the emancipation of Protestants, Catholics, and Jews, respectively, in the nineteenth century. The political impulse to divorce nationality and religious belonging is as salient today as it was in the times of the Grand Sanhedrin or the Lateran Accords. Immigration scholarship in the 1990s has shown how the Marshallian progression of rights was disaggregated and reordered: the acquisition of social membership preceded political membership for non-Europeans residing in late twentieth-century Europe. Yet, as these populations age, reproduce, and make their lives in adopted countries, the challenge of politically incorporating migrants into representative institutions--especially religious representative institutions--is increasingly pressing. The holy grail of group integration, as a shared desire among migrant advocates and conservative political parties alike, may depend on micro-integration strategies: with regard to the common goal of integration, association with religious institutions is seen as an aid to migrant Jews. So long as Islamic religious institutions are based abroad, they will be seen as a hindrance to the integration of Muslims. Corporatist arrangements such as those in place for the Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish communities set a participatory floor and ceiling. A minimum of rights and representation is guaranteed, while the upper limit of those groups' inclusion or voice is limited. Herein lies corporatism's mutually beneficial tradeoff. As Claus Offe writes, corporatism solves problems created by conflicts between the often excessive "demands by interest groups and the capacity of the political system." Thus we can read Offe--similarly to the Colliers' "inducements and constraints"--as endorsing corporatism's ability to elicit constraints and obligations in exchange for advantages and privileges.(7) Elementarily viewed, the state grants citizenship status and full participatory rights, securing in return a group's acceptance of liberal democratic values and the rule of law.

This consensus influences and legitimates refugee and integration policy decision making at the federal level. The same claim will hold for the city-state level in Berlin, the capital city, the site of daily bureaucratic decisions regarding naturalization, deportation, and financing decisions that concern religious communities and migrant associations. The strongly divergent bureaucratic treatment of two "transnational" immigration groups will be the main focus here. One cornerstone of this research is that these policies have not been influenced by overarching human rights discussions or international institutions.(8) The outcomes are rather the result of national debates over historical responsibility and the assimilability of immigrants in German society.(9) The granting of political rights and cultural recognition to two important religious migrant communities in Germany--Turkish Muslims and former Soviet Jews--is striking in its incongruity. Divergences are most visible in preferential treatment of Jews in three policy areas: immigration, integration

programs, and state support of religious activity. Germany's long-time exclusionary citizenship regime explains part of the disparity in its conferral of minority rights.

Because of the different circumstances of their arrival in Germany, not all foreign groups are subject to the same laws. The three largest groups of immigrants among the 32 million foreigners who came between 1954 and 1999 are German repatriates, ethnic Germans, asylum-seekers, and Turkish and southern European migrant laborers and their families. Different authorities (specifically, for "German" immigrants, the Interior Ministry, and for non-German immigrants, the Commissioners for Foreigners) are responsible for implementing the different naturalization and integration policies. The logic by which the Berlin government internally distributes the labor of minority group support mirrors the citizenship-granting procedures of the Imperial and State Citizenship Law of 1913. Namely, administration of subventions for Turkish associations occurs uniquely within the Senate's Commission for Foreigner Affairs. This includes matters of politics, culture, and religion. The Commission for Foreigner Affairs supports eighty organizations, 30-35 of which fall under the rubric "Turkish." When asked how many Jewish groups received state subventions, the commissioner replied that the information must be gleaned from the culture senator, as the Commission for Foreigner Affairs "does not deal with German organizations."<sup>(10)</sup> But of the 12,000 registered members of the Jewish Community of Berlin, 8,000 or 75 percent were born in the Soviet Union; the majority (5,000) of this immigrant group arrived in Berlin in the years since unification, the rest beginning in the mid-1970s.<sup>(11)</sup> More than half of the Turks were either born in Germany or have lived there for more than twenty years.<sup>(12)</sup> Manfred Becker, who is responsible for the Culture Ministry's religion office, stated: "we have close to zero contact with the Turkish communities. They speak first with the Commission for Foreigner Affairs, even when religion is the issue."<sup>(13)</sup> In the Culture Ministry's budget for Religious Affairs, there are no expenses listed for the Islamic community, which unlike the Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish communities, is not recognized as a "corporation of public law."<sup>(14)</sup> Migrant Jews are appropriated as Germans, regardless of national origin, and they enjoy full political representation.<sup>(15)</sup> The nationality and citizenship status of Muslims living in Germany apparently plays a decisive role in Islam's exclusion from state institutions.

Corporation status grants groups "special rights which allow individual contact with bureaucratic offices."<sup>(16)</sup> And, even more importantly, "corporations have legal independence," may engage in self-administration and are allowed to negotiate as legal entities."<sup>(17)</sup> The Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish religious communities receive the benefits of state-collected "church taxes," paid by members of their community--and these communities are politically represented at city, state, and federal levels. Because of the small number of Jewish taxpayers, the budget of the Jewish community is underwritten by the Berlin Senate. Religious status in the case of Jewish residents, meanwhile, outweighs national origin in the determination of official support. This is partly a function of the guilt German governments have assumed for the crimes of the Third Reich and their desire to make reparations to Jewry as a whole. Jews also emigrate from countries where they may be considered *grosso modo* a persecuted minority, whereas Muslims come as "economic migrants" from states where they constitute a majority.

This study finds, however, that neither postwar German respect for Jewish religious belonging nor the nationality status of community members sufficiently explains policy discrepancies with regard to the two groups. Cultural stereotypes prove far more decisive here in explaining the local government's interaction with religious minorities. On the basis of qualitative interviews conducted from 1998 through 2000 with three dozen German policy elites, bureaucrats, and religious community leaders, it will be demonstrated how differential treatment is justified by official claims of Jews' inherent proximity to German culture--regardless of their national origins--and by presumptions of the greater social "integrate-ability" (*Integrationsfähigkeit*) of (mostly Russian and Ukrainian) Jewish immigrants with respect to their (mostly Turkish) Muslim counterparts. Three

million Muslims, all but 15 percent foreign nationals, form the third-largest national religious community after the Protestant and Catholic churches.(18) The number of Jews is less dear, but it is known that in the 1990s roughly 150,000 Jewish "quota refugees" from the former Soviet Union joined the 28,000 (one-third of them elderly) members of the Jewish community living in Germany.(19) Quota refugees include the immediate family members of former Soviet Jews, who may or not be Jewish. As of 2000, the Central Council of Jews in Germany represented 85,000 registered members.(20) Since the Muslim and Jewish communities consist overwhelmingly of non-German permanent residents, a comparative study of their respective "church-state" relations provides a unique look at the development and operation of preferential policies towards migrant and religious minorities.(21) It also demonstrates the selective flexibility of German administrative practice and "imagined community," especially noteworthy because of Germany's long-standing reputation among academics as a paradigm of ethnocultural exclusivity.(22)

Since 2000, German nationality is extended to individuals born in Germany to a parent who has resided in the country for more than eight years. This will lead to a dramatic advancement in immigrant rights, as foreigner law comes closer to matching the social reality of foreigners in Germany. The new law redraws the boundaries of national community; with this step, religious belonging may eventually be separated from national belonging for all immigrants. The German government currently insists upon "making it explicit that the homeland of Jews who live here, who are German citizens, is not Israel" and that "one must make a clean distinction between religious and national belonging!"(23) And, in a press release accompanying the Federal Government's answer to a Bundestag inquiry on "Islam in Germany," it is spelled out that "the theme of Islam in Germany should not any longer be seen as a topic for foreigners."(24) The automatic granting of citizenship to the children of Muslim foreigners will likely turn out to be a milestone in the right to equal religious representation. The national loyalty of Turkish Muslims may no longer be doubted once the coming generations become (and remain) German citizens; negotiating a statute for Muslim communities can only become less controversial when all discussion partners are nationals. Just as importantly, state-sponsored integration of non-German foreigners--a policy that follows the Dutch model--will begin for the first time in earnest. This acknowledges that:

Jewish refugees, Russian-speaking foreigners, or new Turkish arrivals consistently have the same integration problems. And it makes sense to orient policy towards these problems and their solutions rather than according to the group's residence status, which was the case for a long time.(25)

There is yet time before the concrete effects of the citizenship law reform will be known. The final version of the adopted bill includes an opt-out from German citizenship: the German-born child of foreigners must choose between the parents' passport and the German one at the age of twenty-three. The interviews conducted for this research show that the 2.3 million Turks, 317,000 of whom became German citizens between 1988 and 1999, still are not accepted as citizens with equal rights. Additionally, they are often viewed homogeneously without distinction among sub-groups or generations. Official impressions of their integration today, after three generations in Germany, reveal how much progress will need to be made, however, before they are considered to be at home in their adopted country.

This study focuses on the reasons for differing government support of the Jewish and Turkish communities in Germany and specifically, in the capital city Berlin. From November 1998 through May 1999, and in June 2000, 35 interviews about German attitudes towards these two minorities with local and national administrators (13) and politicians (9), and with Jewish (8) and Turkish/Muslim (5) community leaders.(26) These interviews shed light on the official motivations and, sometimes, personal justifications for ethnic minority policy directions. Elite actor perceptions

of how much a given minority group "belongs"--the key to material resource allocation--are formed in subtle processes not always bound to strict legal interpretation. Elite bureaucrats and politicians may selectively interpret existing legislation. Interior ministry officials have discretionary leeway in applying immigration, naturalization, and asylum law: a single signature can recommend deportation or "regularization" of residence status. Bureaucrats responsible for cultural affairs may pursue contacts more or less rigorously even with officially unrecognized religious communities. Politicians can author bilateral "policy contracts" between minority groups and the state. The analysis relies heavily on data gathered from the interviews with senior civil servants. The frankness encountered in these semi-structured interviews about migrant religious minorities in Germany reveals under what conditions Germany has encouraged migrant groups to join a community of interests or, rather, left them to assimilate or segregate on their own. These bureaucrats' views of migrant groups' integration prospects and the place of minority groups in German society can influence their decision making as well as future directions of policy making and enforcement. The following issues will be discussed in turn: (1) nationality and legal status in Germany; (2) the renaissance of the Jewish community and the arrival of the Turkish Gastarbeiter, (3) the Berlin Senate's support of these two communities; (4) German national interest and the migration of Turks and Jews; (5) official perceptions of how easily these two migrant groups can be integrated into society; (6) the correspondence of official rhetoric on the motives behind Turkish and Jewish immigration motivation and their integration into society; (7) Jewish and Turkish/Muslim capacities to organize community interests.

#### I. "Native Foreigners and Foreign Germans"(27): Nationality and Legal Status in Germany

Until 1999, Germany defined its citizenry, as Brubaker states, by "genealogical rather than territorial coordinates."(28) Unlike countries with *ius soli*, where birth on national territory assures citizenship, Germany adhered to *ius sanguinis*: citizenship was acquired solely through German ancestry. Out of a population of 80 million, roughly 9 percent have foreign nationality; many of these would have naturalized if they lived in a standard "immigration country," especially the more than one million "native-born foreigners." An impressive 16.2 percent of the current German population was born outside of today's borders.(29) Even after the citizenship law reform, Germany will still produce foreigners: half of the 100,000 children born annually to foreigners will still not be eligible for German nationality.(30) In migration studies the divergent treatment of ethnic German (*Spataussiedler*) and Turkish immigrant groups, the country's largest, has served as an illustration of Germany's ethno-cultural policy bias.(31) More than 3.5 million ethnic Germans from the former Soviet Union and eastern Europe have been immediately enfranchised, granted citizenship, and given linguistic and economic integration assistance by the state.(32) Turkish guestworkers, their families, and German-born kin (2.2 million total) have limited political rights, wait eight to fifteen years for a German passport, and are left largely to integrate (or segregate) on their own.(33) As elsewhere, dual citizenship is usually forbidden: non-German migrants must forfeit their former national identity card when naturalizing. Although both are ostensibly permanent migrant groups, the Turks' "home" is often still presumed to be Turkey. The perceived "pre-Germanness" of migrant group identity is closely tied to expectations of its members' eventual integration into society. The state-facilitated legal integration of ethnic Germans and the corresponding, highly bureaucratized path to citizenship for Turks reflects these expectations. Ethnic German and non-German migrants alike are encouraged to fit in rather than maintain a "homeland" identity. Naturalization guidelines express that "commitment to Germany shall be judged from [the migrant's] fundamental attitude [towards] the German cultural realm. A permanent commitment is principally not to be assumed when the applicant is active in a political emigrant association."(34) "Multiculturalism" is a term often laden with negative connotations in Germany, and the danger of non-German "parallel societies" is forewarned against across the political spectrum. Multiculturalists' ideal of "plurality" is contrasted with the feared outcome of "particularism, [and] a totalitarianism of particular cultures."(35) Richard von Weizsacker, for

example, declared in the Berlin house of deputies in 1981 that "our foreign citizens must choose between two possibilities: either returning home or staying in Berlin ... there is no third way, except that multiple cities would grow within our single city--and that must not be allowed to occur."(36)

One risks oversimplifying Germany's complex national identity when questions of sociopolitical inclusion and exclusion are linked only to the presence or absence of blood lines. If *ius soli* and *ius sanguinis* represent opposing rights-granting regimes on a macro level, a close examination of comparative ethnic minority treatment on a group-by-group basis reveals a more complicated situation. Citizenship regimes, immigration law, and ethnic minority policy are the expressions and tools of national membership norms. Their combined national and local legal spheres delimit the social and political rights of minority groups. Yet juridical guidelines are not the only determinant of minority group status. German immigration and integration policy, like that of other western democracies in the postwar and postcolonial period, is one founded on group preferences. Offering permanent residence and full citizenship rights to political refugees, for example, is favored over extending these rights to "economic migrants." The official line that Germany is not a country of immigration meant that Turks, who first came for economic reasons, were not recognized as immigrants per se. German policy preferences for members of their "ethnic community" or for certain political refugees need not be viewed differently than, say, the Immigration and Naturalization Service's favoritism of Cubans over Haitians or the Israeli "law of return." Geopolitical interests, economic-conjunctural considerations, and humanitarian grounds--subjective in each national context--all play a role in regulating migration.(37) Between 1950 and 2000, Germany naturalized millions of ethnic Germans arriving from within the former boundaries of the German and Soviet empires without publicly expressing concern for their possible economic motivation in immigration. Acceptance and integration policy thus had a strong ethnocentric emphasis. But two important legal guarantees of political asylum also tacitly invited hundreds of thousands of non-German residents onto national territory each year. Like ethnic German status, asylum or refugee standing places migrants on a fast track to German citizenship and provides German language courses and six-months' start-up money. Approximately 10 percent of asylum seekers are recognized annually as *bona fide* refugees under Constitutional Article 16/16a, and about 4 percent on average receive recognition under section 51.1 of the Alien Law.(38) These modest proportions conceal those groups whose successful asylum applications are a foregone conclusion, for example, the Vietnamese "boat people" in the 1980s, and Bosnian and Kurdish refugees in the 1990s.(39) Jewish quota refugees are treated "analogously to" other quota refugees with the exception that there is no ceiling on the permissible number of migrants; their numbers could easily reach 200,000 by 2005.(40) Jewish migrants should be viewed as a hybrid of political refugees and ethnic Germans. This is not just about reparations policy or even humanitarian measures. Unlike Bosnians or boat people, Jewish quota refugees are favored because of their presumed ties to German culture. And unlike Turkish Muslims, Jews are officially encouraged to join their religious brethren in a state-supported community. Jewish quota refugees are considered "well-integrated Germans" in the same way as are Romanian, Polish, or Russian ethnic Germans (*Spataussiedler*): all enjoy legal and rhetorical treatment as Germans without any complaint that they form an immigrant block apart. The Berlin Culture Ministry official in charge of religious communities stated: "We don't discuss the fact [that the Jews are Russian]. We simply don't discuss it ... Once they make the decision to stay in Berlin, then they become Germans of Jewish persuasion."(41) The former federal commissioner for foreigners, Schmalz-Jacobsen, offered a comparison:

When I go to a Spataussiedler settlement ... I don't feel like I'm in Germany anymore, because everyone is speaking Russian ... But we put a template over them and say, "These are Germans!" And we put the same

template over the Jews. "God knows where these people were born, but somewhere there were German roots, and they must all be taken care of and financed." (42)

When local officials do acknowledge integration problems for these groups, they maintain that their solution is only a matter of time or money. When justifying differential treatment of Turks, in contrast, officials emphasize the importance and entrenched nature of Turkish integration problems. One Interior Ministry official volunteered the following: "We don't really have in a pure sense `a foreigner problem'. It is really primarily a Turkish problem."(43) In an article entitled "Immigration Problems: The Berlin Case," this same official writes about the most "visible" foreign group in Berlin: the 180,000 Muslims. "A significant portion of the post-war immigrants have a totally different civilizational, social and cultural background than the resident German population," and continues with the observation that "the largest group of foreign criminals last year was Turks, who accounted for 19.7% of foreigner crime."(44) Another senior Interior Ministry bureaucrat insisted that

despite naturalization, not all groups are equally equipped for integration into German ways of life. Let us take the biggest foreigner group in Berlin: Turks.... We actually only have the problem that Turks concentrate in certain parts of the city.

But how can one begin to assess the official political and financial arrangements of the Turkish and Jewish communities in a comparative light? There are, on the one hand, an infinite number of differences between the history, makeup, and interests of the respective Jewish and Turkish communities in Germany. No discussion of "German-Jewish" relations can ignore the unique burden of historical responsibility for the Holocaust, nor how this might skew any comparison of the treatment of Jews with that of other religious minorities. Indeed, current generous support of the Jewish community in cultural and religious domains is the outgrowth of the reparations policy begun by the federal government in 1952, which was complemented in following years by local government contracts at the state level. Critical examination of the postwar evolution of the Jewish reparation package allows one to view German policy towards immigrant Turks with a new perspective. Cultural difference is allowed, even sponsored, in the Jewish community but feared and forewarned against in the Turkish one. The lubricant for successful incorporation--that is, state money for linguistic and social integration programs--is mostly withheld from the Turkish population. The integrative role to be played by a corporatist-style, locally based religious community is fully taken advantage of with respect to the migrant Jewish population but not at all for the Muslim population.(45) A close examination of the policy demands of, and responses to, these groups highlights surprising similarities between these two mostly foreign communities as well as important contradictions in German integration politics. There is a difference in German attitudes with respect to the state's responsibility--historical, in the case of Jews, and legal, with regard to Turks--for their active integration into society. But there is also a large gap regarding the perceived capacity for integration of one population compared to the other.

## II. (Re)Constructing Community

### A. The Jewish Community

In 1933 at least 170,000 German citizens of Jewish persuasion called Berlin home, roughly one-fifth of the pre-Third-Reich German-Jewish population.(46) This community, which had schools, libraries, synagogues, a museum and community centers, was reduced through exile and genocide to 5,000 twelve years later. Its possessions, establishments, and cultural presence went the way of their previous owners, inhabitants, and participants. The early 1950s witnessed the

introduction of a vigorously liberal immigration policy for foreign Jews and a reparations policy towards Jews living in Germany that would continue strong through the following half-century.. The rebuilding of infrastructure and support of cultural and religious activities that could be achieved with taxpayer money was pursued. The reestablishment of Jewish life and community in Germany would be a test of regaining the faith of a group integral to German history, and also that of the anxiously on-looking world. General Lucius Clay, the US military governor, stated that Allied success in the democratization of Germany would be measured by how the country treated its Jews;(47) from early on, the United States pressured Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's government to formulate an unambiguous policy towards Jews and Israel. High Commissioner John McCloy enunciated clearly in July 1949 that "the world will carefully observe the new West German state, and a decisive test will be its relationship with the Jews, and how it handles this."(48) In symbolic terms Germany was quick to recognize its own interest, both symbolic and economic, in repairing the rifts. One piece of advice offered to Adenauer by his adviser Herbert Blankenhorn in a 1950 cabinet meeting is particularly salient:

The new German state will only win back trust, esteem and credibility in the world when the federal government distances itself from the past with an impressive material reparation package ... if we are able to manage the Jewish question in the world, then our economic life would reap the benefits.(49)

Receptive of cues from across the Atlantic, and genuine in its will to redress the wrongs of the past, the government would create a safe haven for Jews without historic precedent (with the exception of the newly founded state of Israel) in the deliberate hope of setting a new, positive tone in the fledgling Federal Republic.(50) The apologetic and restoration-oriented stance of West German authorities, which long safeguarded the means to practice Judaism in the Federal Republic, culminated in an open invitation to Jews and their family members to immigrate following the fall of the Berlin Wall.(51) They would be defined as quota refugees under the 1951 Geneva Convention: persecution would need not be proven at an individual level, but rather membership in a persecuted group (Jews in the former USSR) would be grounds for refugee status.(52)

The idea behind the 1991 Quota Refugee Law (Kontingentfluchtlingsgesetz) was that these Jews could carry out their lives more freely in Germany than in Russia; as Manfred Becker of the Berlin Culture Ministry said, "they come to Germany to have a home, a spiritual home."(53) Ignatz Bubis, the late president of the Central Council of Jews in Germany, described two factors in the mid-1990 negotiations between the Jewish community and the German government that led to the decision to classify Soviet Jews as quota refugees.(54)

I said two things: first, 600,000 Jews used to live in Germany. Today, it is 28,000. It is not the Jews' fault that they became so few. There is a moral duty. Just before, Germany had accepted 30,000 Vietnamese boat people--so I said, that is a humanitarian gesture, with the boat people. That is already 2,000 more than there are Jews. Vietnamese never had any relationship to Germany. The second thing I said, was something Germany should view as important. If Jews want to live in this Germany, that is something that today's Germans should appreciate and say `Jews have trust in German democracy.' (55)

According to Bubis, Chancellor Kohl particularly agreed with this second point. On January 9, 1991 the state governors of all Lander approved the Quota Refugee Law. Jews arriving within eight months of the fall of the USSR with only tourist visas could claim "immediate, unlimited right

to residence, and federally financed integration facilitation such as language courses, job placement, enrollment for study, etc."(56) After February 1991, the proper application could be filled out at the German consulate or embassy in the Jews' country of origin before departure (as is the procedure for ethnic Germans), and anyone arriving without proper permission would be subject to the same regulations as all other non-EU foreigners. But Jewish migrants continued to arrive well after the established date with only tourist visas (if any visa at all) and the senate found it impossible to treat them as just any foreigners. The Judische Gemeinde pressured the senate to allow Jews and their families who had any living relatives in Berlin to be accepted indefinitely as quota refugees. An internal brief from the Berlin Interior Ministry describes this move as "a regulation which was 'bought' by the political parties as a one-time exception, even though it was actually a group status regulation which would have required a special procedure by the federal Interior Ministry."(57)

## B. The Arrival of Turkish Guestworkers

Turkish workers were invited to Germany beginning in the early 1960s as part of a mutually beneficial arrangement, whereby the guestworkers could earn comparatively favorable wages to reinvest at home and Germany could meet its demand for labor. This was not an immigration policy, however. It was never intended that these guestworkers would settle in German cities, and a revolving-door system was established in order to discourage it. Differing integration measures for the two migrant groups were taken according to these expectations. In the coming decades, world political events would alter the Turkish and Jewish landscapes beyond what Chancellor Adenauer's advisers could have imagined. In confluence with the oil crisis, German unemployment doubled to 2.6 percent, or nearly 600,000 between 1973 and 1974--up from around 150,000 at the height of the guest worker program. When the government ended the migrant labor program, many guest-workers and their families--backed by a favorable ruling from the Constitutional Court--were already permanent residents. The rotation principle had shown its flaws as early as 1967, when notwithstanding negative economic growth rate most Turkish workers stayed in Germany.(58) This trend would only increase in the six remaining years of the guest worker program, and the 1973 freeze in recruitment actually provided an incentive for non-EU workers to remain in the country.(59) At the same time Soviet Jews began to trickle in to both Berlins, and by the dissolution of the USSR a united Germany was committed to accepting any who chose to come. The non-German population grew from 3.5 million in 1973 to 4.5 million in 1980; in the years since, it has just less than doubled--to 9 percent of Germany's population.

## C. Religion and Nationality

The massive influx of Jews that followed the Quota Refugee Law was matched by an increase in subventions aiding migrant integration into both the Jewish community (through cultural and religious activities in Russian) and German society (through special German language courses and professional training).(60) At this juncture, state support of the Jewish community merges with an activist integration policy towards non-German migrants. Additional subsidized social occasions and Jewish education are organized by the communities, aiming to draw these former Soviet citizens to Judaism. Officials in interviews repeatedly referred to the desire to "strengthen the Jewish community" in Germany when justifying the Quota Refugee Law. Islam suffers for its recent implantation: Barbara John, the Berlin foreigners commissioner commented that

the privileges that [the Protestant, Catholic and Jewish] religious communities have are obtained through their recognition as a public corporation, and there is not this recognition for Islam ... Islam is simply an existing world religion.(61)

John also stated that

the senate's policy towards the Jewish community is a reparations policy ... but out of this, a multicultural policy has emerged ... Okay, this maybe does not have so much to do with German Jews. [But this is] because they were persecuted as Jews [during National Socialism], not as Germans. (62)

Religious belonging, regardless of nationality, is the primary consideration in rights-granting. The federal culture minister views this as unproblematic and consistent with German-Jewish history: "a significant part of the Berlin Jewish community before the Nazi period was also of east European origin ... The so-called German Jews also came sometime from somewhere!"(63) If Jews integrated once, then they can do so again: "the big Jewish minority that was here [before National Socialism] felt completely German, even to the point of being German nationalists," said the Federal Interior Ministry's secretary of state.(64) Foreign Jews in Germany, then, are recognized as transnational members of a community whose home and permanent destination is Germany. "It is a fundamental belief of the Berlin Senate to demonstrate a great readiness to accommodate [the Jewish settlers]," a Berlin Interior Ministry official stated.(65) But of Turks it is expected, as a Culture Ministry official phrased it, "that they will stop being Turkish."(66) The formalizing of Turkish or Islamic interests as a block apart, as such, is seen as a potential threat to German democracy--for such an articulation of group-specific interests would mean, in the words of Berlin's Interior Minister Werthebach, the "segregation from the value consensus of the majority culture"(67) Because of the historical experience of foreign Jewish populations in Germany, bureaucrats and politicians expect that also today's foreign Jewish community will be integrated without a problem.

### III. Comparison of Support from the Berlin Senate

#### A. The Jewish Community

The opening paragraph of the present-day state contract governing the relationship between the Berlin government and the Jewish community captures the spirit of resultant postwar arrangements:

Out of responsibility for German history, which is imprinted with the persecution and annihilation of German and European people of Jewish belief and origin, and in acknowledgment of the loss that Berlin and Germany have suffered as a result, Berlin affirms ... that it will protect and secure the avowal and exercise of the Jewish faith for all time.(68)

In practical terms, this investment amounts to dedicating a sizable portion of the state budget to the community for both determined and unspecified Jewish activities. Between 1997 and 1999, Berlin's Culture Ministry annually doled out DM 43 million for costs associated with Jewish prayer and education. This figure constitutes nearly 30 percent of the ministry's DM 145 million religion budget for a group that accounts for 0.58 percent of the population.(69) Even accounting for the one-time costs for the period from 1992 to 2002 for DM 165 million, the Berlin Senate has agreed to pay the annual costs of the Jewish community for DM 18 million per annum. Then there is the financial support of Jewish artists, cemeteries, Russian-Jewish immigrant integration,(70) community-building maintenance, security, synagogue programs, and so on. As the state-recognized representative of a religious community (the only other two in Berlin are the Protestant and Catholic churches), the Jüdische Gemeinde also has 90 percent of personnel costs paid for its private school employees. "Nowhere in Germany does the Jewish community have so much

financing as it does in Berlin," claimed one culture ministry official proudly.(71) The totals in church taxes paid by community members is not sufficient, some estimate that the Jewish community receives up to DM 45 million of its DM 48 million annual expenses from the Berlin government.(72) This may seem like a lot of accommodation for a small group--the per capita allotment tallies to roughly DM 3,000 per Jewish resident of Berlin; Andreas Nachama, leader of the Berlin's Jewish community, stated that "with respect to our smallness we get a rather considerable portion of state support."(73) Ignatz Bubis put it in a different light: "One can't look at it per capita. One religion teacher can teach 60 children. But for three children you also need a teacher. That is the difference. Our small number doesn't mean we have different needs."(74) As Hans Jakob Ginsburg observes in another context, the disproportionate financial support could be seen "not as the representation of a few thousand living, but rather that of millions of murdered Jews."(75) Until Berlin has 170,000 Jewish citizens again, some feel, there is a void that one must attempt, somehow, to fill.

## B. The Turkish Community

Thirty of the 120 or so Turkish and Kurdish organizations in Berlin, which represent the 150,000 Turkish residents of the city, received a total of DM 89 million in the 1996 Berlin Senate budget for Turkish and Kurdish organizations; or, DM 550 per Turkish resident of Berlin.(76) A Berlin Interior Ministry official observed:

When you just look at the size of the population represented, there are about 10,000 Jews and roughly 150,000 Turks. If you compare the [respective] financial support for the Turkish and Jewish Communities, you could of course say that this is unacceptably disproportionate.(77)

Barbara John, Berlin's foreigner affairs commissioner, offered the following explanation:

We do not support other minority groups in the same way [as we do Jews] because the reparation aspect, luckily, does not exist with these other groups. That would have been horrible if the Germans had done to other minorities [what they did to the Jews]--they would have certainly, given the chance--but luckily these other groups were not here.(78)

But in the context of a de facto multiethnic society, some Turkish leaders have a hard time forgiving the extent to which different standards are applied. Representative are the remarks of the president of the Turkish Community of Berlin:

One must understand that the Jewish community has another situation, it's a question of history, and it is therefore somewhat different than with other foreigners. 10,000 Jews live here, but 180,000 Turks. The Jews get millions and millions, but as Turks we get DM 54,000 here. That's just rent and electricity, telephone ... And for example we get DM 20,000 a year for social work. But the Jews get 350 social workers paid the whole day through.(79)

The numerical logic at work in this response--accurate or not--demonstrates a recognition of injustice and hints at some envy. The president of the Turkish Parents Association, a small educational equality lobbying group, put it succinctly: "every time a Jew opens his mouth, he has money and all sorts of things poured into it."(80) The resources designated for ethnic minority cultural or religious activity are seen here as a common pool of funds--but the legal status of immigrant Turks precludes equitable distribution.

#### IV. Germany's National Interest and Migration

##### A. "Something most welcome" Jewish Migration in Germany

The immigration allowance for Soviet Jews fits into the framework of reparations philosophy, which was to recreate a "blooming Jewish community," in Adenauer's words.(81) "We only realized in the last few years that Jewish citizens could again play an important cultural role in German society," said the secretary of state of the Interior Ministry. "[Jews] can again be recognized as a group both in public life and also in the consciousness of many people, with a public role. This is a very good development. We already have one of the biggest Jewish communities in Europe again, which is something most welcome."(82) The Berlin Culture Ministry official stated similarly, that "[our treatment of the Jewish community] is a form of gratefulness. It is not self-evident that Jews would stay in Germany, organize themselves, or want to stay any longer. We thankfully recognize the fact [that they do]."(83)

A combination of guilt and the projection of "German traits" onto non-German Jews allows the Berlin administration to privilege their social position. The sociologist Michal Bodemann views some aspects of this distinction, however, with suspicion. The special treatment of Jews in Germany today, he argues, serves both conciliatory and less noble political ends: "Although under different conditions, even today the Jewish minority as an incorporated group must carry out ideological labor [in Germany]. And in different ways it is instrumentalized by the German state for both internal and external political ends." (1986: 52). The implication here is that the special policy arrangements for the Jewish community are externally useful as a certification of German rehabilitation, and internally as indemnity against claims of cultural insensitivity for minority rights.

Historical responsibility aside, these positions can also be explained by the belief that, in generally supporting Jewish culture, one is indirectly supporting German culture. Commissioner Barbara John stated emphatically: "The cultural legacy of German Jewry is German!" "It is not Turkish or Rumanian or anything else!"(84) Malte Krause, a top civil servant of Berlin's Interior Ministry, also supported this approach: "Germany sees the [present] fruition and construction of the Jewish community as the recovery of a part of its own historical culture. It is therefore also in our national interest to strengthen and support the Jewish community.(85)

An enormous amount of money is poured into the Jewish community in support of myriad activities both crucial and beneficial to presently flourishing Jewish life in Germany. Authorities maintain and protect a Jewish presence for the sake of both reconciliation with the Jewish community and the general reestablishment of trust in German democracy. The desecration of former Jewish community chairman Heinz Galinski's grave in fall 1998 inspired the following comment by a Berlin Interior Ministry official:

This created a lot of worries in Berlin. It was evidence for how important it is to prevent such incidents for the sake of our system's political stability ... Just imagine what kind of discussion would take place in Berlin, or maybe all of Europe or even worldwide, if anything happened to a member of the Jewish community that could have been avoided had the Berlin Senate handled things differently.(86)

This official is acutely aware of Germany's political stability and the potential for damaging discussion at the expense of the country's hard-earned postwar reputation for tolerance. Public gestures of this tolerance are especially important, for obvious reasons, with regard to the Jewish community. Government officials wasted no time in appropriating funds for a large-scale public tolerance campaign following several antisemitic incidents in summer 2000. The Berlin Senate's

determination to maintain a visible Jewish presence, through facilitated immigration, and cultural and religious subventions, represents the policy side of protecting physical sites like Galinski's gravestone and countless other buildings of the Jewish community.

#### B. "Ihre eigene Interesse": Turkish Migration to Germany

Speaking of postwar migration fluxes, a senior civil servant in Berlin's Interior Ministry said: "The greatest number of foreigners who came to Germany did not come here because we had defined it in our national interest, but rather as after-effects of the guest worker program from the 1960s ... This was not the expression of Germany's national interest."(87) An official in Berlin's Commission for Foreigner Affairs similarly observed that "the Turks have profited from the fact that they came to Germany; they were recruited as guestworkers and stayed because it was useful and good for them."(88) Herein implied, of course, is that it was not necessarily "useful and good" for Germany--namely, that the settlement of guestworkers and their families was not in the nation's interest. In the absence of a national immigration policy, ad hoc measures providing for the arrival of family members were developed. But Germany had not explicitly planned for this eventuality, and the momentum of this unexpected immigration took on a life of its own.

This disjunction between technical terminology and real life can be traced back to the observation that one group's immigration and presence is declared to be in the national interest and the other's is not. Once this classification is established, the gate is then opened to create exceptional policies and regulations. Malte Krause stated: "There are ... limits that Zuwanderung should not be permitted to overstep. But this feeling is not present with respect to the Jewish community. Therefore there are special rules."(98) It is hardly debatable that Turks came to Germany in their "own interest," but there seems to be a certain blindness with regard to the motivations for Russian Jewish migration. Economic reasoning would appear to have been at least as important as religious persecution--or the less plausible "desire to return home to Germany."

#### V. Nationality, Intelligence, and the Social "Integrate-ability" of Turks and Jews

The question of a group's permanent destination--and status in the country of origin--is of key significance to local officials' attitudes towards the Muslim and Jewish populations. It is presumed that Jewish refugees are not likely to return to their countries of origin and will naturalize as soon as possible. Turks, in contrast, who as a group naturalize at an extremely low rate, reserve the right to "go back home"--even when born and raised in Germany.(90) A former interior minister of Berlin stated that "Turks see themselves much more as a nation. But I don't know that the Jews who live in Russia feel Israeli, rather they feel like Jews! And that is also what differentiates them from the Turks."(91) National origin is therefore interpreted as a signal of the willingness to integrate into German society. This sentiment has also been expressed by the top civil servant in charge of foreigner affairs in the Berlin Interior Ministry, Hans-Joachim Rose:

I think that Russian [Jews] integrate more easily because there is no more option to return to Russia. With Turks one has the impression that there is still somewhere hidden, consciously or unconsciously, at least still in the second generation and maybe the third generation too, a certain option to return home. Perhaps it really is nicer to spend one's old age in Turkey, but for Russians that's not an issue. They say "we're happy that we're out of there, we must now plan for our future here."(92)

The migrants' national origin greatly influences the degree of state encouragement of formal religious representation and support of their native religion and culture(93); nationality is also taken to imply a migrant group's capacity to integrate. Those groups belonging to the majority in

their country of origin and who came to Germany for "economic reasons" may be seen as a temporary presence or, at worst, as a fifth column. In the absence of state-organized, centralized "communitarist" initiatives for the Muslim population, their scattered organizational development has taken shape along national (and sectarian) lines. This retreat into their native culture--without any particular host country reference--is accompanied by a social, commercial, and political segregation of Turkish neighborhoods.(94)

Malte Krause observed that "there are strong differences between the Jewish and Turkish communities: in the Jewish community there is a group of people who, as Germans in Germany with a specific religious alignment, pose no problems either for security or religious tolerance. Insofar as there are questions of integration, they pose themselves of course only with the Turkish community." When pressed, Krause acknowledged that "for Russian Jewish immigrants, who perhaps cannot master the German language, and who lived for a long time under a dictatorship, there are integration problems of course. But the German state is ready to do anything necessary so that integration succeeds."(95) A former interior minister of Berlin also conceded that "I know from talks with members of the Jewish community that there are difficulties in the community and, in part, with integration ... but if the Jewish community looks for help, we help in any possible way."(96) That these foreign Jews can be accepted and adopted immediately as Germans of Jewish persuasion--regardless of their original Russian, Ukrainian, or Bielorussian citizenship--reflects German assumptions about religious and national identity politics. Namely, they are expected to assimilate in a way that Turks are perceived as being incapable of doing.

The significance of national origin in official attitudes is compounded by more general assumptions about the influence of religious doctrine and level of education on the group's differing assimilability. The fact that most of the adult Jewish quota refugees are urban academics, and that the first generation of Turkish guestworkers in the early 1960s were manual laborers from the poorest regions of Anatolia, influences these assumptions. But this does not distinguish between first and third generation Turks. The number two civil servant in charge of foreigners in the Berlin Interior Ministry found that religious orientation of Turkish migrants did not facilitate their social insertion:

The more different the religion, the more the religious ideas make integration harder. And it is so that with the Muslim population, if I may say so, with their intellectually restricted background [mit intellektuell einfach gestricktem Hintergrund], especially hard, because they are so traditional, they don't even accept the role of women in the same way as we in our society do.(97)

Additionally, the former federal culture minister warned that

Islam has not yet given up its dogma. Islam is relatively tolerant, but there are many different kinds of Islam and in certain regions it is not tolerant at all.... [T]he process of integrating Islam into German cultural life will take place over more than 50 years and will succeed. But it will depend on the readiness of Islamic leaders, religious leaders--and one must have some doubts about this--to allow an ecumenical form of religious belief. If they don't do that then integration will be made more difficult. This is not about Islamic scarves, this is about intermarriage.(98)

It is hard to imagine German officials expressing concern about the orthodoxy of Jewish faith or recommending the dilution of the Jewish community through mixed marriages. The level of migrants' education has also been cited as a reason for segregationist tendencies on the part of

## Turks:

Most [of the Jews] are on average better educated and more intelligent people than the Turkish immigrants ... And it is usually the case that, when someone has a particular intellectual background, it is clear to him that if he wants to have a role in society, has no other choice but to open himself to society and enter it.(99)

As becomes evident from these two quotations, there is a conflation between intelligence and level of education that pervades this official's discourse on the readiness of Russian Jews and Turkish Muslims to join German society. The level of education, however, is indirectly tied to impressions of migrant groups' ability to speak German, another key aspect of social integration:

When one speaks about language problems, one speaks almost always exclusively about Turks. Even with the former Yugoslav guestworkers who lived here and became citizens, with them the language problem was never so virulent [as it is with Turks].(100)

From the small amount of data available, it is not clear that the positive integration balance in rhetoric corresponds with reality. Jewish quota refugees also have an average unemployment rate of 30 percent (in 1995). The director of Munich's employment office said in an interview that "linguistic and professional deficits make it more difficult for Jewish refugees to find adequate employment. Unemployed Russians and Ukrainians in Munich tend to be the Jewish refugees."(101) "As a rule they arrive without German language abilities and less than half are able to pass a language test even after a six-month Interior Ministry language course."(102) The concept of Integrationsbereitschaft, or readiness to be integrated (the lack of which is assumed in the Turkish community and whose presence is ascribed to the Jewish community), is hard to quantify. Bubis maintained that the difference between Turks and Jews is the question of willingness to leave their old identity behind: "we have Jews today from the ex-USSR who are not of German origin. But they come here to live and to become German. Ninety-nine percent of the migrants from the ex-USSR ask 'when can we finally become German?' Turks don't ask that. That is the big difference."(103) Nachama agreed with Berlin officials and Bubis about eventual Jewish integration, saying that "it is always the children who are the first to integrate. It always takes a generation before they start reading German literature and German newspapers."(104)

## VI. Immigration Motives and Tendencies towards Segregation

But does rhetoric on assimilability and the motives behind immigration to Germany square with the experience of community leaders? The official justifications for the Quota Refugee Law are founded on a loose interpretation of these settlers' situation. As one Culture Ministry official said, "Although there are antisemitic voices in Russia, we all know there are no pogroms taking place."(105) Even their Jewishness is, to a large extent, inchoate. Many of the refugees are Jewish only to the extent that the so-called fifth point on their Soviet passports said they were. Barbara John said frankly, "most [of the Quota refugees] have absolutely no relationship with Judaism at all." Becker of the Culture Ministry acknowledges that "some of them have no knowledge at all of Judaism. They know nothing of Judaism. They don't even know a single Hebrew word."(106) This is a rather limited understanding of the multiple ways to express one's Judaism, but the official's message is that the Russian Jews who choose to come to Germany, in sum, are those for whom religion is relatively unimportant.

Berlin's former Interior Minister Schonbohm has also spoken of the Russian Jewish immigrants as "returning" to Germany (wiederzuruckgekehrt) to escape from "difficult conditions in Russia."(107)

Like other politicians, Schonbohm has classified the immigration under a sentimental rubric, perhaps taking comfort in the idea that victimized Jews are being saved from persecution in another land:

Turks come here to participate in the German economy, to earn money ... Jews come here because it was their home, or the home of their parents, and they want to live here. That is a different motivation [than for Turks], so to speak. Perhaps with some of them the economic situation plays a role. But there are above all differences in the motivation for why they come to Germany. (108)

It is in this light that the Russian Jews can be seen as "returning" to Germany; the revitalization of the neighborhood of Jewish stores and community buildings in and around the Oranienburger Stra[Be]te, where Hebrew, Yiddish, or Russian can be heard spoken, is charming--a stroll through a lost golden age--and a magnet for wealthy American and European tourists.(109) But the Turkish equivalent concentrated at the Kottbusser Tor is widely denounced as a "ghetto" or "parallel society."(110) As Bavaria's Interior Minister Beckstein (CSU) has commented, "we do not want Chinatowns and Polish cities [sic] like there are in the United States."(111) Officials insist that no comparable phenomenon exists in the Russian Jewish community.(112) But one need only take a stroll through what has been termed "Charlottengrad" to question this formulation.(113) One study of migrant Berlin described this community in terms one usually hears applied to "non-German" migrant neighborhoods:

New urban spaces have emerged which are modeled on old preferences since many know no German or cannot read Latin characters ... This desired segregation ... the desire of a large number of migrants who want to stay among themselves is not just typical of this one neighborhood ... marriage occurs almost exclusively among immigrants alone.(114)

In the words of one Jewish organizer, the Jewish quota refugees were those who "didn't really want to go to Israel."(115) They are attracted by Germany's relatively attractive economy and generous state assistance. Irina Knochenhauer, a Jewish community leader from the former Soviet Union said that migrating to Germany "is a rather untypical step for older Jews from the former Soviet Union, who suffered very much during the war--it is actually an internal compromise." Economic and geographic considerations, she maintained, were of prime importance:

When their pensions are not sufficient anymore--because of the fall of the ruble--and then they hear that in Germany a minimum for survival is guaranteed, medical attention is guaranteed, burial is guaranteed, then that is quite important for a Jew ... There is a choice among three countries: Israel, Germany, and America. America takes only certain groups of Jews who have familial relations of the first degree. Israel is, for many, myself included, too oriental. That is the Orient, it's too hot, it's not European. And most Jews who come here, are from the European or east European origin. And for older people it's very hard to live in Israel. But here, it's just a two-hour flight from Berlin--maybe there are husbands' graves [in Russia], etc.(116)

Knochenhauer also noted that many of "these people have as a rule no particular understanding of Judaism. As a whole they learned only that it was bad to be Jewish." With regard to their attitudes towards integration into German society, her impression of the Jewish quota refugees

was altogether different than that of Berlin politicians and civil servants.

Just as the reality of the Jewish situation may differ than the optimistic rhetoric of German officials, leaders of the Islamic community have insisted that Muslims do feel German: "Seventy-five percent of Muslims in Germany were born or grew up here. That is already a basis for integration ... Most Muslims are not German [citizens]. But that does not mean that they do not feel like German Muslims.:(117) A 1999 survey of the Turkish population in Berlin conducted by the Senate Commission for Foreigner Affairs found that Turks were becoming more rather than less integrated into German society: 87 percent favored mandatory integration and language courses; 35 percent (versus 49 percent in 1993) brought their spouse from Turkey; 56 percent (up from 45 percent in 1993) owned no property in Turkey; and 55 percent (down from 66.4 percent in 1993) visit Turkey annually (37 percent go less often, 8 percent more often).

## VII. Capacities to Organize Community

Some interview respondents have contended that exceptions in immigration and citizenship law and ethnic minority policy are possible when small numbers of people are involved. Germany's 2.2 million Turks number more than twenty times the size of the Jewish population. Others posit that special recognition depends on group legitimacy and organization. If Turks had a unified central organization lobbying local governments, one argument goes, they might benefit to the same extent as do Jews from funding for religious and cultural activity. This could occur only if Islam, like Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism were recognized as a public corporation. As Cornelia Schmalz-Jacobsen, the former federal commissioner for foreigners, said: "That is only the half truth. It goes deeper: [Turks] are `so foreign,' no? ... You will have noticed, for example, that many people simply confuse Islam, the world religion, with religious fundamentalism."(118) As the spokesman for the current federal commissioner for foreigners affairs noted:

There is a whole series of German-Jewish linkages—there is a common history, a sad history, but a history nonetheless ... But as far as Turkish culture goes, we still have the image of the Turks invading Vienna in the sixteenth century. If you ask around on the street, "what do you think of when you hear the word `Turkish,'" then in response you see that Islamic fundamentalism is deeply rooted in the collective consciousness—the threat of the Turkish army closing in on Vienna.(119)

The negative stereotyping of Islam is of course not unique to Germany; the refusal to recognize Islam as an official religious community, however, is revealing of a specific reluctance to view even second- and third-generation Turks as anything other than foreigners. The consensus on differing motivations for Turkish and Jewish migration, and the divergent roles that the two groups are then assigned once in Germany, strongly influences these minorities' respective capacities to organize political pressure and, in the long run, to integrate themselves into German society.

But it is also, apparently, an organizational question: the Culture Ministry official cites the confused, diffuse state of Turkish representation in explaining the impossibility of providing Turks the same opportunities in a religious context. "Cooperation could exist ... but the Turks are rather unorganized ... Islam itself is a structure-poor religion ... very diffuse and informal."(120) Nachama also stated that the "incalculable" number of Turkish communities and groups is their weakness-- "when they build up one or two central organizations [like ours] then they will get the same help."(121) Comparing the organizational evolution of the two communities, the secretary of state of the Federal Interior Ministry commented that the "Central Council of Jews in Germany is in a very fortunate situation right now, because it has a unified structure and clear leadership;" to gain equality, Muslims would need to learn to cooperate better together.

The community of Muslims who live here is somewhat splintered.. What is missing is the integrative power of a Muslim Community--but we are far from that point ... Unified is perhaps too much to ask, because there are 2.3 million Turks alone plus Muslims of other nationalities. But we do need competent interlocutors who represent a certain majority in the Muslim population. But I still see big problems in this area.

Nadeem Elyas, head of the Central Council of Muslims in Germany made a similar observation, saying that

We must be able to work even without the status of public corporation ... It is not such a dominant or existential question for us. Because such a status would bring internal strife, which would be more damaging than useful ... Some kind of organizational structure must exist that binds us to the state. But this structure must not necessarily be the same structure as there is for the churches ... this hierarchical structure ... which says what one must believe and what one may not believe, what is right and what is wrong, is rejected by Islam.(122)

Elyas represents a dialogue-oriented organization that engages other religious communities and the German state. But not all Muslim councils are of the same nature; in the absence of German sponsorship of Islam, some of the 2,500 Islamic organizations in Germany have spent years cultivating their contacts with foreign government supporters. The spokesman for the Federal Commission for Foreigners Affairs lamented the fact that

Since so little was done for religious needs [of migrants], structures developed which have led in part to segregation and ghettoization processes.... We said that "we didn't need to pay attention to this because they were all going home anyway." We therefore missed the opportunity to open German institutions to immigrant groups and did not watch out for what kind of independent structures were developing. This makes today's dialogue and bilateral openness [between Turks and Germans] somewhat problematic.

The new citizenship law may orient these organizations' constituents towards Germany and away from their country of origin. But this will take a great commitment on the German side to extend the institutional "welcome mat"--in terms of state funding and political and religious representation--to the same extent as they have done for Jews.

## Conclusion

"On the one hand, Germany's openness towards the Jews makes our life easier and facilitates our interaction with German society," said Elyas, the head of the Central Council of Muslims in Germany. "Here we have a model, an ideal, of character and relationship with the state. We can say, for example, in the same way that you treat Jews, with openness, tolerance and acceptance, so should you interact with every religious community."(123) The reparations arrangements for Jews in Germany are remarkable and historically unique. As a result, "Germany has the fastest growing Jewish presence in the world outside Israel."(124) But can political trust operate on purely bilateral terms between former perpetrator and former victim, or does the desire to re-create political community require the pluralistic extension of special rights to maximize, within limits, democratization? Can the reestablishment of political trust in postwar Germany rest squarely and uniquely on the revival of the Jewish community? Werner Nell writes how debates over "the recognition of the immigrant situation" pitted "the partly catastrophic history of German nationalism

[against] a cosmopolitan-oriented alternative."(125) Speaking hypothetically, Malte Krause noted that one way to recreate trust after what he called "those twelve years" might have been the position that:

Germany should be especially foreigner-friendly, especially receptive, regardless of how much that would cost. [To prevent a return to Germany's] original serf-understanding [would be] to permit the largest possible arrival of foreigners, and allow a multi-cultural society to develop, [and to establish] the image that there are different cultural spaces which can peacefully coexist, without the obligation that German norms and values dominate society.(126)

The state secretary of the Federal Interior Ministry corroborated this sentiment:

I believe that we in Germany still have the image of a homogeneous society. What we learned from the horror of the Nazi period is that we must be especially attentive and rigorously fight any racist or xenophobic action. Other peoples also have this responsibility, but we especially so ... I believe that a certain cultural colorfulness is really good for us.(127)

The political energy in the first fifty years of the Federal Republic that might have been expended on reforming the nationality code focused on generous asylum policy and reparations arrangements. Reparations policy is targeted and limited: the welcoming, acceptance, and promotion of Jews as a form of repentance and rebuilding of trust is the end in itself. The measures for their insertion in German society have been introduced without public controversy or debate--perhaps in part because of the small numbers involved, but largely because of the symbolic value that a new Jewish presence lends to Germany.(128) The mood, tone, or philosophy of the policy is not extended to other groups, regardless of their size or need to be integrated and supported in German society, such as the Turkish population living in Germany.

Barbara John referred to this contradictory situation "the terrible irony of history":

The former generation of Germans persecuted and killed Jews because they had the impression they were somehow foreign. Which is ridiculous. Now they have 3 million Muslims who really, definitely are foreign ... Now the Germans are democratic and bear this burden. The question is how long they will stay democratic. I think that they will stay democratic because they have--thank god--learned their lesson. Most of them, anyway.

Until this "lesson" is made concrete--and Muslims are fully integrated into German society--the Jews may be seen as Germany's albatross and its license. Ever remorseful for the senseless murder in its past, Germany courageously assumes the burden of showing all who will look that it did wrong and hopes to redeem itself. But the Ancient Mariner who shot the albatross only understands his error--and is finally freed of its burden--in appreciating what lessons to draw from his action: in Coleridge's maritime terms, appreciating "the beauty" of all "happy living things" of the sea.(129) One senses that the self-flagellation over the mistakes of Nazi Germany focuses exclusively on reviving the albatross and fails to apply its lessons to the greater goal of reestablishing domestic and international political trust.

As briefly discussed in the introduction, the first non-Christian Democratic government in sixteen years recently set a new course for citizenship law in Germany with the abolishment of the strict *ius sanguinis* requirements. Beginning in January 2000, elements of *ius soli* were introduced for all born in the Federal Republic so that the "second-and-a-half" generation of immigrants will be

automatically granted citizenship. The secretary of state of the Federal Interior Ministry said that

The reform of citizenship law is an important signal and offer to immigrants that they should feel welcome here ... that they can and should automatically be German from the time of birth ... Our ancient citizenship law now contains an element of the principle that residence and place of birth determines nationality, not just the ancestry or kind of blood that flows through one's veins.(130)

Upon the constitution's fiftieth anniversary in May 1999, also, the new German President Johannes Rau made a point in his inaugural address to say he would represent all Germans, "especially those still without a German passport." In his first Berliner Rede, a state-of-the-union style address, Rau called upon Germans to "look back [and see] that new arrivals to Germany [for example, Poles] have been successfully integrated in the past, and can be successfully integrated again." He made a small historical step by being the first head of state to extend a fixed invitation to the head of the Muslim community in Germany to many official state receptions.

The legal landscape is in flux. The difference in state support will be made in how a German Islam is encouraged to emerge. Will a formal Islamic public corporation, or some appropriate equivalent, be recognized? Applications for corporation status were filed as early as the 1950s in some federal states. The condition that religious communities must be chartered for a minimum of thirty years and represent at least 1/1000 of the local population discourage further applications.(131) The new citizenship law will strengthen these organizations' orientation towards Germany and away from countries of origin. This will likely lead to an institutional opening with regard to state financing and political representation as it occurred for Jewish migrants. Jews without German ancestors or knowledge of the German language--with an unemployment rate of 30 percent--have been rhetorically and politically integrated. Will it be so dramatic to do the same for German speaking, third-generation Turks with an overall unemployment rate of 24 percent?(132) It remains an open question whether the coming generations of German Muslims will follow the example of the Jehovah's Witnesses who received corporation status in December 2000; the Karlsruhe Constitutional Court declared that, in order to receive official recognition, religious communities need not demonstrate a "positive orientation towards the German state."(133)

Migrant Jews from the former Soviet Union have been "converted" into Germans for many legal and rhetorical purposes in a process not unlike that undergone by ethnic German immigrants. This is often based on the presumably unproblematic integration of the Russian Jews. Concrete problems of linguistic and professional integration are countered with financial solutions unavailable for Turkish migrants. This paper has aimed to show how elite consensus remains fixed in certain areas with regard to who "belongs" and therefore which minorities receive material support for cultural, political, and religious activities. The coming years will show to what extent the change in citizenship law will radically alter the organizational experience of "non-German" minorities.

## Notes

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(1.) An interview subject named Laszlo, quoted in Judith Kessler, "Eine Kaleidoskop von Meinungen," in Von Aizenberg bis Zaidelman: Jüdische Zuwanderer aus Osteuropa in Berlin und

die Jüdische Gemeinde heute (Berlin, 1997).

(2.) Nadeem Elyas, Central Council of Muslims, chair, interview by author, 14.06.2000.

(3.) Exact numbers are not available, but it is estimated that there are 180,000 Muslims in Berlin, including 137,000 Turks. For official statistics from Berlin's Interior Ministry, see Bericht zur Integrations- und Ausländerpolitik des Senats von Berlin 1996/1997 (Berlin 1998) and Hans-Burkhard Richter "Probleme der Zuwanderung am Beispiel Berlins," in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B 46/97 (November 1997). It is estimated that there are more than 16,000 Jews in Berlin, three-quarters of whom are dues-paying community members; Joel Levy, Ronald Lauder Foundation, president, interview by author, 23.12.1998. Thirty percent of the "foreign" Turkish population were born in Berlin (40,510 out of 137,111) and another 23 percent (31,830) have lived in the city for more than twenty years; "Nichtdeutsche nach ausgewählten Herkunftsgebieten und Aufenthaltsdauer am 31.12.1997" in Bericht des Senats (Berlin, 1998). The Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin, the largest umbrella organization of Turkish and Islamic groups, estimates that one-third of its 30,000 members were born in Germany, and that an additional third has lived in Berlin for twenty plus years; Sabri Adak, Turkish Community of Berlin, chair, interview by author, 14.12.1998.

(4.) The naturalization rate among Turks in Berlin hovers around 10 percent, much lower than the expected rate of migrant Jews; Barbara John, Commissioner for Foreigner Affairs, Berlin Senate, interview by author, 20.06.2000.

(5.) See, for example, Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal, Limits of Citizenship. Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe (Chicago, 1994), Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge, 1992), and Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship. A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford, 1995).

(6.) National Foreign Intelligence Board, "Growing Global Migration and its Implications for the United States," NIE 2001 02-D (Washington, 2001), figure 2.

(7.) Claus Offe, "The Attribution of Public Status to Interest Groups: Observations on the West German Case," in Organizing Interests in Western Europe, Suzanne Berger, ed. (Cambridge, 1981). Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, "Inducements versus Constraints: Disaggregating Corporatism," American Political Science Review 73 (1979).

(8.) Soysal (see note 5).

(9.) Harro Honolka and Irene Gotz, Deutsche Identität und das Zusammenleben mit Fremden (Wiesbaden, 1999).

(10.) Barbara John, interview by author, 17.12.1998 (see note 3). This may also have to do with the reluctance of German authorities to meddle with Jewish affairs: the money is transferred to the Community, which is then responsible for administering integration programs, etc., on its own.

(11.) Amory Burchard, "Trockenfisch im Morgenrot," Der Tagesspiegel, 31 January 1999.

(12.) See note 3.

(13.) Manfred Becker, Berlin Ministry of Science, Research and Culture, Referatsleiter Kirchen, Religions- und Weltanschauungsverbände, interview by author, 11.02.1999

(14.) Recently, the Islamic Federation in Berlin was recognized as a "religious community" in a ruling by the upper administrative court; see Oberverwaltungsgericht 7 B 4.98, 4 November 1998.

It remains to be seen if and when this court decision--appealed by the Berlin Senate at the federal administrative court--will be set in practice; see Bundesverwaltungsgericht 6 c.5.99, 23 February 2000. The Jewish communities receive their subsidies from the Berlin House of Deputies' (Abgeordnetenhaus) budget under the title of "Church Subsidies"; Vorabdruck zur Beratung im Abgeordnetenhaus 17 90 1999 (Berlin House of Deputies, 1999).

(15.) Andreas Nachama, former chair of the Jewish Community in Berlin, described his contact with local government offices: "the individual senators who are responsible for us, in particular the Senator for Cultural Affairs, with whom we meet every four to six weeks ... and naturally also the Mayor ... and we also of course have good relations with the Senator for Public Works"; interview by Ruud Koopmans for MERCI project, 19.02.1999.

(16.) German Bundestag Document, Bundesdrucksache 14/4530 (Berlin, 2000)

(17.) This status is described in Article 137, paragraph 5, sentence 2 of the Weimar Constitution and in Article 140 of Basic Law.

(18.) Of this number, there are 2.3m Turks, 180,000 Bosnians, 123,000 Iranians, 105,000 Moroccans, etc. Only 370,000-450,000 are German citizens; Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Grosse Anfrage Islam in Deutschland, German Bundestag Document, Bundesdrucksache 14/2301, draft from 25.06.00 (Berlin, 2000).

(19.) Statistics as of 31.07.00, obtained from Bundesverwaltungsamt, department III-4.K-1.04.50/03. Only about 70% of the emigrants will become members of the community, and non-Jewish family members are included in the number of arrivals; Beni Bloch, Central Welfare Agency of Jews in Germany, director, telephone interview by author, 03.08.2000\*.

(20.) Without the new arrivals it is estimated that the community would number only 19,000 today; Bloch (see note 19).

(21.) More than half of the 2.2m Turkish citizens living in Germany have permanent resident status and 40% have limited resident permits. Slightly more than 11,000 have a temporary suspension of deportation and 147,782 are not categorized in official documentation. See "Facts and Figures," Federal Government's Commissioner for Foreigners (Berlin, 1999).

(22.) This characterization only made sense before the 1999 citizenship law reform.

(23.) Cornelia Sonntag-Wolgast, Parliamentary Secretary of State, Federal Interior Ministry, interview by author, 03.07.2000.

(24.) German Bundestag Publishing Office, Heute im Bundestag, Dezember (Berlin, 2000).

(25.) Bernd Knopf, Federal Commission for Foreigner Affairs, spokesman, interview by author, 29.06.2000.

(26.) All interviews were conducted in German, except those with native English speakers.

(27.) This formulation is borrowed from Ruud Koopmans' article "Deutschland und seine Einwanderer: ein gespaltenes Verhältnis," in Max Kaase and Gunther Schmid, eds., Eine lernende Demokratie (Berlin, 1999).

(28.) Brubaker (see note 5), 119.

(29.) These statistics can be found in Rainer Munz's unpublished manuscript, "Ethnos or Demos?"

Migration and Citizenship in Germany" (2000) or on his website: <http://www.demographie.de>.

(30.) Cem Ozdemir, B90/Die Grunen, speaker on domestic affairs, interview by author, 10.04.2001\*.

(31.) Koopmans (see note 27).

(32.) 1.5 million "Spataussiedler" from the ex-USSR, Rumania and Poland migrated to Germany between 1950-1987, and 2 million more did so between 1990-1999; Koopmans (see note 27) and table 4 in Migrationsbericht 1999, Mitteilungen der Beauftragten der Bundesregierung fur Auslanderfragen (Berlin, 1999).

(33.) Most Turks have the right to social assistance, but as non-EU citizens they do not have the right to vote in local elections. As non-Germans they may not vote in national elections and their right to assembly is not constitutionally guaranteed.

(34.) K-U. Hailbronner and G. Renner, Staatsangehorigkeitsrecht: Kommentar (Munich, 1998), 864.

(35.) Werner Nell, "Multikulturelle oder transkulturelle Gesellschaft?" in Anton Escher, ed., Auslander in Deutschland. Probleme einer transkulturellen Gesellschaft aus geographischer Sicht (Mainz 2000), 14.

(36.) Richter (see note 3), 20.

(37.) Barbara Schmitter-Heissler contends that studying the distinction made by authorities between types of immigration--best expressed with the terms Einwanderung and Zuwanderung--provides a useful interpretative schema for understanding the differential treatment and attitudes afforded the two groups. The first term, Einwanderung, is reserved for American-style selective immigration policy, whose conditions and quotas are dictated by so-called "national interest." The 1965 Foreigners Act codified this principle, making "the entrance and tenure of foreigners dependent on the interests of the Federal Republic"; Wesley Chapin, Germany for the Germans? The Political Effects of International Migration (Denver, 1997), 13. The term Zuwanderung, on the other hand, denotes that settlement is mostly in the interest of the migrants themselves, not that of the host country. This would be applied to those who migrate in order to better their economic situation or those who flee political oppression, for example.

(38.) Section 51(1) is the "Gesetz uber Massnahmen fur im Rahmen humanitarer Hilfsaktionen aufgenommene Fluchtlinge" (quota refugee law), which was approved in 1980. This law applies to members of "a persecuted group," who do not need to provide proof of their own personal persecution; Migrationsbericht (see note 31).

(39.) Civil war refugees are protected under section 32a of foreigners' law (Auslandergesetz).

(40.) The instructions against a ceiling on the quota read, in German: "Bei dieser Form der Zuwanderung wurde auf eine Kontingentierung verzichtet"; Migrationsbericht (see note 31), 23. An additional 70,000 Jewish Quota Refugee applications are currently being handled by German consular services in the former Soviet republics; Bloch (see note 19). In June 2001, the president of the Central Council of Jews in Germany expressed the desire that only 25,000 Jewish quota refugees should be allowed to immigrate over the next four years.

(41.) Becker (see note 13).

(42.) Cornelia Schmalz Jacobsen, former Federal Commissioner for Foreigner Affairs, interview by

author, 26.02.1999.

(43.) Hans-Burkhard Richter, Berlin Interior Ministry, Regierungsdirektor für Ausländerfragen, interview by author, 16.06.2000.

(44.) Richter (see note 3).

(45.) There is an interesting exception to state sponsorship of Muslim communities which proves the rule: since 1971 the "Geistlichen Verwaltung der Muslimflechtlinge" (Administration of Muslim Refugees) receives an annual budget of DM 208,455 to support two Imams and the religious activity of Muslim "war refugees" who were in Germany following the end of WWII, in addition to about 18,000 Albanian and Azerbaidjani quota refugees; German Bundestag Document, Bundesdrucksache 14/2301.

(46.) Y. Michal Bodemann, "Staat und Ethnizität" in Micha Brumlik, eds., *Judisches Leben in Deutschland seit 1945* (Frankfurt, 1986), 58. In *Gedachtnistheater* (Hamburg, 1996), Bodemann argues that the 1933 Jewish population stood at circa 1 million. The author of the Berlin foreigner commissioner's brochure on Jewish immigrants suggests the number was about half that; Kessler (see note 1).

(47.) Andreas Nachama, "Foreword" in Andrew Roth and Michael Frajman, *Jewish Berlin* (Berlin, 1998).

(48.) Cited in Bodemann (1986, 62); see note 46.

(49.) This is not unlike the logic employed by Gerhard Schröder the candidate and later, the Chancellor, in pressuring Volkswagen (in spring 1998) and Deutsche Bank (during spring 1999) to settle slave-labor and war-crimes claims in the interest of present-day German investment and merger interests. On the February 1999 day that Deutsche Bank announced its complicity in the financing of Auschwitz, its share value dropped precipitously.

(50.) When a television interviewer asked Adenauer if the post-war reparation policy could be seen as the moral high-point of his career, Adenauer responded "don't forget just how powerful the Jews in America are" ["Vergessen Sie nicht, wie mächtig die Juden in Amerika sind!"]; Hans Jakob Ginsburg, "Politik Danach--Judische Interessenvertretung in der BRD" in Brumlik, 109 (see note 46). Even Erik Honecker may have subscribed to this belief-his creation of the Neue Synagoge Stiftung in Berlin with DM80 million capital during the waning years of the GDR was seen as a tactic to flatter his way to Washington. Joel Levy comments on this logic "going to the white house helps your regime and how do you do that? You do something for the Jews. This incredibly anti-Semitic assumption that the Jews control everything, but there it is"; Levy (see note 4).

(51.) This was actually a policy of the interim government of the GDR which was adopted by the FRG with the accord of the governors of all federal states; Jeroen Doomernik, *Going West: Soviet Jewish Immigrants in Berlin since 1990* (Avebury, 1996).

(52.) Doomernik (see note 51), 53-54.

(53.) Becker (see note 13).

(54.) He and Heinz Galinski (then chair of the Central Council of German Jews) conducted the negotiations with Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Interior Minister Wolfgang Schauble.

(55.) Ignatz Bubis, Central Council of Jews in Germany, former chair, interview by author,

13.05.1999.

(56.) Internal memorandum, Berlin Interior Ministry, Referent für Ausländerrecht, Senatsverwaltung für Inneres, Vermerk, IV A4 - 0345/2446, 10. November 1998.

(57.) Ibid., 2.

(58.) Chapin, 12 (see note 37).

(59.) Chapin refers to this as the "boomerang effect" (ibid.). Turkish migrants began to spend more of their income in Germany, with the savings rate dropping from 45 per cent in the 1970s to 16 per cent in the 1980s and investments in real estate and life insurance simultaneously increasing; Cornelia Schmalz-Jacobsen and Georg Hansen, eds., *Kleines Lexikon der ethnischen Minderheiten in Deutschland* (Bonn, 1997), 167.

(60.) A bomb placed near a Düsseldorf train station on 27.07.00 injured ten Jewish quota refugees on their way home from an obligatory state-sponsored language course; six of them were members of the Düsseldorf Jewish community.

(61.) John, interview by Ruud Koopmans for MERCI project, 11.03.1999 (see note 4).

(62.) John (see note 4).

(63.) Michael Naumann, former Minister of State in the Federal Chancellery and Federal Commissioner for Cultural and Media Affairs, interview by author, 30.06.2000.

(64.) Sonntag-Wolgast (see note 23).

(65.) Malte Krause, Berlin Interior Ministry, Grundsatzangelegenheiten der Innenpolitik u. Planung, Leiter, interview by author, 27.01.1999.

(66.) Becker (see note 13).

(67.) Unpublished position paper, Berlin Interior Ministry, Positionspapier Ausländerpolitik in Berlin, Senatsverwaltung für Inneres Berlin, Grundsatzangelegenheiten der Innenpolitik/Planung, 8.12.1999, 6.

(68.) Berlin House of Deputies Document, Gesetz zum Staatsvertrag über die Beziehungen des Landes Berlin zur Jüdischen Gemeinde zu Berlin, Ges.Nr.94/61/3B, 8.2.94 (Berlin, 1994).

(69.) Berlin Ministry for Science, Research and Culture internal document, "Leistungen an die Kirchen."

(70.) The classification of Russian Jewish immigrants as political refugees under the Geneva Refugee Convention will be discussed in detail below.

(71.) Becker, interview by Ruud Koopmans, 20.04.1999 (see note 13).

(72.) Cited by Y. Michal Bodemann during, *Galut 2000--Aufbruch zu einer europäische-jüdischen Identität*, Kolloquium im Centrum Judaicum Berlin, 6.12.98. Only DM9.8m are considered as official reparations payment; Nachama, interview by author, 23.02.1999 (see note 15).

(73.) Nachama (see note 15).

(74.) Bubis (see note 55).

- (75.) Ginsburg (see note 50), 108; here he discusses the number of permanent Jewish seats on public broadcasting stations' advisory boards.
- (76.) Berlin House of Deputies Document, Drucksache 13/628 Nr 573 u. 574, Berliner Abgeordnetenhaus 25.07.96 (Berlin, 1996). This does not include the costs associated with training for teachers to better cope with integration-related challenges. "There are teachers in Kindergarten who specially handle integration assignments, who are paid for by the State of Berlin, and this money is not counted in the same way"; Jorg Schonbohm, Interior Minister, Brandenburg, interview by author, 26.03.1999.
- (77.) Krause (see note 65).
- (78.) John, interview by author, 17.12.1998 (see note 4).
- (79.) Adak (see note 3).
- (80.) Kasim Ayden, Turkish Parents Association, President, interview by author, 16.12.98
- (81.) Bodemann (see note 46), 158
- (82.) Sonntag-Wolgast (see note 23).
- (83.) Becker (see note 13). This echoes former Chancellor Kohl's 1988 Rosh Hashanah address to the Jewish Community in Berlin: "we appreciate with thankfulness and great respect for every Jewish citizen, that today there is again an active Jewish Community in Germany. It is a great encouragement that you are able to recognize in Germany your home"; Bodemann, Gedachtnistheater (see note 46), 175.
- (84.) John (see note 78).
- (85.) See note 65.
- (86.) Krause (see note 65). Galinski's grave was then assigned a 24-hour police guard (Der Tagesspiegel, 16.2.99); also, Ignatz Bubis later declined burial in Germany for fear of similar attacks.
- (87.) Krause (see note 65).
- (88.) John (see note 78).
- (89.) Krause (see note 65).
- (90.) Many point to the prohibition of double citizenship as the reason why the overall naturalization rate for Turks is around 10%, although this rate varies considerably by federal state. Since the new citizenship law's introduction, naturalization requests have increased and are expected to continue to do so.
- (91.) Schonbohm (see note 76).
- (92.) Hans-Joachim Rose, Berlin Interior Ministry, Senatsdirigent und Leiter, Abteilung IV (Staatsangehorigkeit, Auslander), interview by author, 28.06.2000.
- (93.) Riva Kastoryano, La France, l'Allemagne et leurs immigres: negocier l'identite (Paris, 1996).

(94.) Jorg Schonbohm was forced out of his position as Interior Minister of Berlin in the aftermath of comments that he did not "feel like [he] was in Germany anymore" when he walked through Turkish neighborhoods in the capital.

(95.) Krause (see note 65).

(96.) Schonbohm (see note 76).

(97.) Richter (see note 43).

(98.) Naumann (see note 63).

(99.) Richter (see note 43).

(100.) Rose (see note 93).

(101.) Interview with Erwin Blume, "Bildung und Beruf," 10 June 2000, *Suddeutsche Zeitung*. See also Otto Romberg and Susanne Urban-Fair, eds., *Jews in Germany after 1945: Citizens or "Fellow" Citizens?* (Frankfurt, 2000).

(102.) Report by Brandenburg Commissioner for Foreigners' Affairs, "Betr.: Judische Zuwanderer aus der ehemaligen Sowjetunion `Judische Emigranten und ihre Familien"; <http://www.brandenburg.de/land/masgf/soz...ngspolitik/Diskussionsentwurf/int222.htm>

(103.) Bubis (see note 55).

(104.) Nachama (see note 72).

(105.) Becker (see note 13).

(106.) Ibid.

(107.) Schonbohm (see note 76).

(108.) Ibid.

(109.) Julius Schoeps, head of the Moses Mendelssohn Center for European-Jewish Studies at the University of Potsdam, characterizes the recent rise of philosemitism in Berlin as "the result of the fact that the non Jewish society is not yet prepared to face history. This is the opposite of normalization. This is folklore"; Meike Wohlert, "Der Hype um den Davidstern," *Zitty*, May 1998. The active promotion of a Jewish profile at the expense of other minority groups does not restrict itself to officialdom: Wohlert also observes that newspaper readers would be hard pressed to not get the impression that there were more Jews in this city than Turks and Bosnians combined."

(110.) Krause (see note 65).

(111.) See "Union befurchtet `Chinatowns'", *Der Tagesspiegel*, 5.2.99. Along the same lines, the Social Democrat in charge of religious communities in the Berlin Culture Ministry, Manfred Becker, creatively named these isolated communities "biotopes." He defines this as "a strong concentration [of non-Germans] which is evident from the both way the streets look and the whole atmosphere, which makes you say `I am definitely somewhere else'"; Becker (see note 13).

(112.) Ibid.

(113.) Irene Runge even hopes for such a development--she sees the turkish `biotope' as a model

for how older settlers might feel more at home in Berlin; Jewish Cultural Association, first spokeswoman, interview by author, 20.01.1999. Doomernik also notes the development of stores catering to russian clientele (see note 51).

(114.) Renate Amman and Barbara von Neumann-Cosel, eds., Berlin: Eine Stadt im Zeichen der Migration (Berlin, 1997).

(115.) Runge (see note 114).

(116.) Irene Knochenhauer, Jewish Community of Brandenburg, managing director, interview by author, 28.06.2000.

(117.) Elyas (see note 2).

(118.) Schmalz-Jacobsen (see note 41).

(119.) Knopf (see note 25).

(120.) Becker (see note 13).

(121.) Nachama (see note 72).

(122.) Elyas (see note 2).

(123.) Ibid.

(124.) "The best revenge," The Economist, 12.02.1999.

(125.) Nell (see note 35), 10.

(126.) Krause (see note 65).

(127.) Sonntag-Wolgast (see note 23).

(128.) The sole exceptions are the increasing accusations that non-Jews are filing false immigration requests; Klaus Meyer-Teschendorff, Office of the Deputy Speaker Wolfgang Bosbach (CDU/CSU), German Bundestag, interview by author, 27.06.2000. See also Erik Kirschbaum, "German Jewish leader urges immigration clampdown," Reuters, June 6, 2001.

(129.) Samuel Taylor Coleridge, The Rime of the Ancient Mariner (London, 1836).

(130.) Sonntag-Wolgast (see note 23).

(131.) Bundesdrucksache 14/4530 (see note 16).

(132.) Robert Putz, "Von der Nische zum Markt? Turkische Einzelhandler im Rhein-Main-Gebiet," in Escher (see note 35).

(133.) "Verfassungsgericht gibt `Zeugen Jehovas' recht," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 20 December 2000.

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